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Health and Wealth in a Life-Cycle Model 
Abstract 
This paper presents a preliminary model of health investments over the life cycle. Health affects 
both longevity and provides flow utility. We analyze the interplay between consumption choices 
and investments in health by solving each household’s dynamic optimization problem to obtain 
predictions on health investments and consumption choices over the lifecycle. Our preliminary 
model does a good job of matching the distribution of medical expenses across households in the 
sample. We illustrate the scope of future model applications by examining the effects of a 
stylized Medicare program on patterns of wealth and mortality. 
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assistance. 1  Introduction 
Health and consumption decisions are interlinked, yet the ways that consumption and 
health  interact  are  hard  to  untangle.  Health  changes,  such  as  disability  or  illness, 
aﬀect labor market decisions and hence income and consumption possibilities.  But 
causality undoubtedly also operates in the other direction, where consumption decisions 
such as smoking or exercise aﬀect health.  Moreover, there are also likely unobserved 
diﬀerences between people in their ability to produce and maintain health and human 
capital, leading to correlations between health and lifetime income and wealth.  This 
paper examines links between health, consumption and wealth. 
There are many ways to examine these links.  Our analysis starts from ideas dating 
back at least to Grossman (1972), who argued that health is the cumulative result of in-
vestment and choices (along with randomness) that begin in utero.  We model household 
utility as being a function of consumption and health, where individuals make optimiz-
ing decisions over the production of health along with consumption. Surprisingly, given 
the obvious centrality of health to economic decision-making and well-being, numerical 
models of lifecycle consumption choices generally treat health in a highly stylized fashion. 
The most common approach in papers, including Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); 
Engen,  Gale,  Uccello (1999);  Palumbo (1999);  Scholz,  Seshadri,  Khitatrakun (2006); 
and Kopecky and Koreshkova (2009) ignore health as an argument of utility.  Instead 
lifetime budgets are subject to medical expense shocks that proxy for health shocks. 
Households respond to exogenous medical expense shocks by decreasing consumption 
and by saving for precautionary reasons. 
This paper describes our initial eﬀorts to formulate a life-cycle model that we solve 
household-by-household,  where health investments (including time-use decisions) can 
aﬀect longevity.  By modeling investments in health, longevity becomes an endogenous 
outcome, which allows us to study the eﬀects of changes in safety net policy, for example, 
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 on mortality as well as wealth. 
The  strong  link  observed  in  data  between  income  (and  wealth)  and  longevity  is 
sometimes referred to as the wealth-health (or income-health) gradient.  As we discuss 
below, the factors driving the gradient are unclear and remain controversial.  We do not 
resolve questions about the factors driving the wealth-health gradient.  But our model 
captures the eﬀects that lifetime income has on health investments and mortality, which 
allows us to examine how much of the gradient of mortality with respect to lifetime 
income in the United States can be explained by our model.  We also highlight the 
eﬀects that health investment have on patterns of wealth accumulation around the time 
of retirement and at death. 
To summarize, we examine the links between lifetime income and health by speci-
fying an economic environment, preferences, expectations, and parameters that match 
key features of the underlying data.  We then explore how changes in the economic 
environment and other aspects of the model aﬀect key outcomes, such as longevity and 
wealth.  In doing so, we highlight mechanisms aﬀecting health and wealth that have 
received little attention in the literature. 
Prior work that does not fully account for health in intertemporal models of con-
sumption may yield incomplete or erroneous implications.  For example,  the eﬀects 
of income transfers on consumption may be overstated in the consumption-smoothing 
literature:  in the absence of safety net expenditures, households might maintain con-
sumption at the cost of activities that degrade health and consequently aﬀect longevity. 
These health-reducing activities might include working an additional job (and forego-
ing sleep); foregoing exercise; or eating high-calorie, inexpensive fast food rather than 
healthier home-cooked meals.  Over the long run, eﬀects can be large.  In a world with-
out health-related social insurance, young forward-looking households may recognize the 
futility of accumulating wealth to oﬀset expected late-in-life health shocks and simply 
enjoy a higher standard of living for a shorter expected life.  Depending on lifetime 
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 earnings or the economic environment, other households may sharply increase precau-
tionary saving in a world without health-related social insurance.  Our model provides 
quantitative insight about these responses. 
We, of course, are not the ﬁrst to examine the links between health, consumption, 
and wealth.  Clear discussions are given in Smith (2005) and Case and Deaton (2005) 
and many other places.  More closely related to our work is an important set of papers, 
including Palumbo (1999); Kopecky and Koreshkova (2009); and De Nardi, French and 
Jones (2010) that document the substantial role that late-in-life health shocks, including 
nursing home expenses and social insurance, play in old age wealth decumulation.  While 
these papers oﬀer valuable insights, they fall short of capturing the varied ways that 
health and consumption interact in the Grossman framework.  In particular,  except 
for the model with exogenous medical expense shocks in Section 9 of De Nardi, French 
and Jones (2010), the only response that households have to the realization of medical 
expense  shocks  in  these  models  is  to  alter  consumption.  Death  occurs  through  the 
application of life tables with random longevity draws. 
De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) write down and estimate key structural parame-
ters of a model where consumption and medical expenditures are arguments of utility, 
and where health status and age aﬀect the size of medical-needs shocks.1  Their model 
is estimated on a sample of single individuals age 70 and over.  They ﬁnd that endoge-
nizing medical expense shocks has little eﬀect on their results:  they write "In sum, the 
endogenous medical expense model conﬁrms and reinforces our conclusion that medical 
expenses are a major saving motive and that social insurance aﬀects the saving of the 
income-rich as well as that of the income-poor.  Our main ﬁndings appear robust to 
1Two other related papers model intertemporal consumption decisions and include health in the 
utility function.  Fonseca, Michaud, Galama, and Kapteyn (2009) write down a model similar to ours 
and  solve  the  decision  problem  for  1,500  representative  households.  Consumption  and  health  are 
separable in utility in their model and the focus of their work is on explaining the causes behind the 
increases in health spending and life expectancy between 1965-2005.  Yogo (2009) solves a model similar 
to ours for retired, single women over 65 to examine portfolio choice and annuitization in retirement. 
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 the way in which we model the medical expense decision." As De Nardi et al.  note, 
medical expenditures beyond those provided by Medicaid, Medicare, and private insur-
ance policies may contribute little to overall health.  Moreover, health capital may be 
well-formed by prior decisions and expenditures by the time an individual reaches age 
70. 
We build on the innovative endogenous medical expense model of De Nardi, French 
and Jones (2010)  in three ways.  First,  we model  the process of  health production 
starting at the beginning of working life.  Health is undoubtedly inﬁ uenced by shocks 
and decisions even made in utero  and in childhood.  But forward-looking households 
will respond to income shocks,  health shocks,  or to changes in institutions by alter-
ing their health investments and consumption during their working lives.  Second, as 
De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) and many others note, the contribution of out-of-
pocket medical expenditures on health, particularly late in life, are likely minimal.  Yet 
even in the United States, there is a strong, positive gradient between income/wealth 
and health/mortality.  It is possible that broadly deﬁned health expenditures, such as 
smoking decisions, exercise, diet, and preventative medical care (such as consumption 
of beta-blockers and cholesterol drugs) indeed aﬀect health and longevity.  While our 
approach is stylized, we take a more expansive view than prior work of health invest-
ments.2 
A third distinction is perhaps most important.  De Nardi, French and Jones (2010), 
Kopecky and Koreshkova (2009) and others have shown that anticipated and realized 
medical expenses are an important determinant of wealth decumulation patterns in old 
age.  The focus of our work diﬀers.  We develop a model of wealth and longevity in 
order to study how health shocks aﬀect consumption plans, as done by others in the 
literature, and investments in “health capital.”If death occurs when health falls below 
2As the project develops, we will do more to address other factors that contribute to the health-
wealth gradient, such as the eﬀect that health status has on income, and the likelihood that unobserved 
factors inﬁ uence both human capital and health production. 
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 a given threshold, households may respond to policy or exogenous shocks by reducing 
or increasing consumption and hence altering longevity relative to a world where health 
is not an argument in preferences.  Studying the tradeoﬀ between consumption and 
health investments on longevity (and health status) oﬀers new insights into household 
behavior. 
2  Descriptive Evidence 
We use data from three waves of the Health and Retirement Study, 1998, 2000, and 
2002.  Given these waves, the sample includes households from the AHEAD cohort, 
born before 1924; Children of Depression Age (CODA) cohort, born between 1924 and 
1930; the original HRS cohort, born between 1931 and 1941; and the War Baby cohort, 
born between 1942 and 1947.  The sample is a representative, randomly stratiﬁed sample 
of U.S. households born before 1947.  The HRS modestly oversamples blacks, Hispanics, 
and Floridians. 
There is a strong relationship between lifetime income and survival in the HRS.  To 
show this, we restrict the sample to birth years that, in principle, would allow someone 
to reach a speciﬁc age by the last year of HRS data we have available, 2006.  So, for 
example, when we look at patterns of survival to age 70, we restrict the sample to those 
born before 1936.  We also drop all sample members who were over 65 years old in the 
year they entered the HRS sample.  When we look at survival to age 85, we condition 
the sample to those born before 1921 and drop those who were older than 80 in the year 
they entered the HRS sample.  At this stage of our analysis, we also restrict the sample 
to couples where at least one member allowed researchers to gain access to their social 
security earnings records (under tightly controlled conditions).  Our samples for survival 
to age 70 has 4,724 individuals, our sample for survival to age 85 has 2,118 individuals. 
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Our results on survival probabilities to age 70, tabulated by lifetime income quintile, 
match expectations.  For men, the survival probabilities increase monotonically with 
lifetime income, from 78 percent for those in the lowest lifetime income quintile to 92 per-
cent for those in the highest.  The gradient is apparent but less strong for women, where 
survival probabilities increase from 85 percent in the lowest lifetime income quintile to 
96 percent in the highest. 
Diﬀerential mortality by lifetime income plays a much larger role in the patterns of 
survival to age 85 by lifetime income, which are shown below.  Here it appears that 
diﬀerential mortality by socioeconomic status has an important eﬀect on data patterns. 
Speciﬁcally, men in the lowest lifetime income quintile and women in the bottom two 
lifetime income quintiles die at an early enough age to never appear in the analysis sample 
for surviving to age 85.  This leaves the survivors in the low lifetime income quintiles 
stronger, healthier than the typical household prior to the within-quintile mortality.  The 
patterns for males is nevertheless striking:  men in the highest lifetime income decile are 
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 almost twice as likely to live to age 85 as those in the second lifetime income quintile. 
As with the previous ﬁgure,  the gradient exists but is less strong for women.  The 
two ﬁgures suggest that in the raw, unconditional data, there is a fairly strong positive 
relationship between survival and lifetime income, though the relationship is stronger 
for men than it is for women. 
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These  patterns  are  consistent  with  several  potential  explanations.  Income  may 
aﬀect health.  The gradient may be the result of education or discount rates, which 
aﬀect health behaviors as well as labor market experience.  The gradient may be the 
result of healthier people being able to be more productive in the labor market.  Or most 
likely, each of these factors as well as additional considerations drive the relationship. 
When we examine the correlates of mortality (at ages 75 or 80) in a reduced form 
regression, only a small number of covariates are consistently signiﬁcant:  the survival 
gradient with respect to lifetime income quintiles is positive, but not statistically sig-
niﬁcant.  Education is also not signiﬁcantly correlated with survival.  Rather, males, 
smokers, and beginning-of-sample health conditions, such as heart and lung problems 
or having functional diﬃ culties are signiﬁcantly, negatively correlated with survival.  Of 
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 course, the health conditions are not exogenous to survival probabilities (though we mea-
sure them in the ﬁrst available sample year). When we drop the initial health conditions 
from the regressions, being in the highest lifetime wealth quintile and having more than 
a high school degree are signiﬁcantly, positively correlated with survival to age 80.  As 
in the previous speciﬁcations, survival is negatively correlated with smoking and with 
being male. 
To summarize,  there is a clear relationship between lifetime income and survival. 
There are many likely explanations for the patterns.  We write down and solve a model 
that captures several of these explanations, though we do not model diﬀerences in innate 
ability to produce health capital.  Households in the model have diﬀerent, exogenous 
draws on annual earnings, and hence diﬀerent lifetime incomes.  They diﬀer in the timing 
of exogenous marriage and fertility.  Given diﬀerences in incomes and demographic char-
acteristics, they will respond to health shocks (which vary by lifetime income), earnings 
shocks, and government programs in diﬀerent ways.  Moreover, we allow consumption 
and health to be gross complements or gross substitutes in utility.  The work that fol-
lows, therefore, illuminates the channels through which health, consumption, and wealth 
are related. 
2.1  Health production 
The ﬁrst issue we need to confront when modelling the interplay of health and intertem-
poral consumption decisions is to decide how to model health.  The most straight-
forward approach, borrowing from Grossman (1972), is to allow investment in medical 
care to aﬀect health production (where health, in turn, is an argument of utility).  As 
noted above, however, there is at best mixed evidence that marginal expenditures on 
medical care in the U.S. buy greater health (and hence longevity).  This phenomenon 
is sometimes referred to as “ﬁ at of the curve” medicine.  Evidence comes from the 
Dartmouth Health Atlas (http://dartmouthatlas.org/) and Finkelstein and McKnight 
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 (2008), among others. 
It is noteworthy just how hard scholars need to look to ﬁnd evidence that expen-
ditures on medical care have a discernible,  positive eﬀect on health and particularly 
mortality outcomes.  Card, Dobkin, Maestas (2008), for example, is one of a small num-
ber of studies that ﬁnd expenditures are positively correlated with survival.  Their work 
is based on a very large sample of people admitted to emergency rooms in California: 
they ﬁnd the positive eﬀects of spending apply to a small subset of the conditions that 
lead people to show up in emergency rooms.  Doyle (2010) shows that men who have 
heart attacks when vacationing in Florida have higher survival probabilities if they end 
up being served by high- rather than low-expenditure hospitals.  Despite these two well-
done studies, we need to be careful when modelling the eﬀect of out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures on health production.  Numerous studies suggest signiﬁcant portions of 
medical expenditures have little discernible eﬀect on health. 
Factors such as time spent exercising, smoking decisions, and diet appear to play a 
not-insigniﬁcant role in determining health status and hence longevity.  As the ﬁgure be-
low suggests, for example, exercise is strongly, positively correlated with lifetime income 
in the 3 years used for our primary sample.  Nevertheless, the computational demands 
that arise in solving our dynamic programming model household-by-household with en-
dogenous consumption and health production decisions requires us to be parsimonious in 
our modelling of health.  Given these considerations, we monetize all health-producing 
activities.  The essential tradeoﬀ in the model is between health investments and con-
sumption. For working households, time spent in exercise can be thought of as reducing 
hours available for income-producing opportunities, and therefore reducing consumption 
possibilities. 
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 For retired households: i.e., those drawing their income from pensions, social security, 
and non-labor income, non-monetary expenditures on health production reduce leisure. 
We model (for both working and retired households) a combined time and ﬁnancial 
budget constraint, which we describe in greater detail below.  In this way, we recognize 
that there is an opportunity cost to health-related investments for working and retired 
households.  Hence, our model captures the essential tradeoﬀ between non-health related 
consumption and health investment. 
3  Model Economy 
Households in our model derive utility from health and consumption.  We simplify the 
household’ s intertemporal  problem by treating labor supply and retirement as being 
exogenous.  While earnings are assumed to be exogenous, the expectations households 
have about annual earnings realizations have an important eﬀect on optimal consumption 
and health investment.  We specify earnings expectations using data on annual earnings 
11
 �  � 
realizations from the HRS (from the restricted social security data). Even though adding 
health capital involves only one additional choice variable (relative to a standard life-
cycle intertemporal consumption problem), it is a signiﬁcant complication.  In addition 
to aﬀecting longevity, households derive direct satisfaction from health. 




j−S E nj U(cj /nj ,lj ,hj ) 
j=S 
The expectation operator E denotes the expectation over uncertain future earnings 
and uncertain health shocks, β is the discount rate, j is age, S is the age that a household 
member entered the labor market, c is consumption, and h is health and l stands for 
leisure. nj represents the equivalent number of adults in the household and is a function 
of the number of adults, A, and children, K, in the household g(Aj ,Kj ). 
An innovation of this paper is that we model the determinants of life expectancy. 
We assume that the household possesses a health stock and investments in the health 
stock prolong life. The accumulation process of the stock of health is given by 
hj+1 = f(mj ,ij ) + (1 − δh)hj + εj , j ∈ {S, ...} 
The above equation represents the evolution of health status hj  across ages.  The stock 
of  health  in  the  next  age  hj+1  is  determined  by  the  production  of  health,  given  by 
f(mj ,ij ).  Health capital is produced using time, ij , which could be exercise or other 
health-producing activities, and medical expenditures as inputs.  Households spend an 
indivisible  amount  of  time  ω  working  each  period  and  spend  the  rest  of  their  time 
endowment 1 − ω  on either leisure or on activities that augment health investments. 
Upon retirement, households split their time endowment of 1 unit between leisure and 
health investments.  Total medical expenditures mj are a function M(·) of out of pocket 
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j  .  In the above equation, δh  stands for the depreciation rate of 
health.  Introducing age-dependent shocks to health is both realistic and necessary if 
we are interested in matching biological processes and the data.  These age-dependent 
shocks are denoted by εj .  In typical lifecycle models, medical expenditures have only 
ﬁnancial consequences.  Here medical expenditures aﬀect health capital which, in turn, 
aﬀects utility and longevity.  The modeling approach mimics the modeling of human 
capital — additions to human capital can be either consumption or investment as in 
Becker (1964), Mincer (1974) and the subsequent, vast human capital literature. 
The  probability  of  surviving  into  the  next  period  is  given  by  the  function  Ψ(h). 
This function satisﬁes two properties.  As h goes to ∞, Ψ(h) converges to 1.  Second, 
Ψ(h) = 0 for h ≤ 0.  This ensures that as soon as h goes to zero, the household dies. 
Finally, note that health status aﬀects utility directly. 
Consumption  and  the  age  of  retirement  are  chosen  to  maximize  expected  utility 
subject to the constraints. 
yj = ej + raj + T (ej ,aj , j, nj ),j ∈ {S, ..., R} 
   
R R 
yj = SS ej + DB(eR) + raj + TR(eR, ej,aj , j, nj ),j ∈ {R + 1, ...}
j=S j=S 
cj + aj+1 + mj = yj + aj − τ (ej + raj ),j ∈ {S, ..., R}
       
R 
cj + aj+1 + mj = yj + aj − τ SS ej + DB(eR) + raj ,j ∈ {R + 1, ...}
j=S 
In these expressions y is income, e is earnings, a is assets, r is the interest rate, T  is a 
transfer function, and R is the age of retirement.  Social security (SS) is a function of 
lifetime earnings, deﬁned beneﬁt pensions (DB) are a function of earnings in the last 
year of life, τ is a payroll and income tax function, and the transfer function for retirees 
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(TR) is a function of social security, DB pensions, assets, age, and family structure. 
3.1  Retired Household’ s Dynamic Programming Problem 
A retired household after age R  obtains income from social security,  deﬁned beneﬁt 
pensions, and preretirement assets.  The dynamic programming problem at age j for a 
retired household is given by 
V (eR,ER, a, j, h) = max  nU(c/n, 1 − i, h) + βΨ(h)  V (eR,ER, a, j + 1,h
')dΞ(ε) 
subject to 
y = SS(ER) + DB(eR) + ra + TR(eR,ER, a, j, n) 
'  oop c + a + m = y + a − τ(SS(ER), DB(eR) + ra) 
h
' = F (M(m
oop),i) + (1 − δh)h + ε 
In the above equation the value function, V (eR,ER, a, j, h), denotes the present dis-
counted value of maximized utility from age j until the date of death, the '  superscript 
denotes the corresponding value in the following year; and, as noted before, Ψ(h) de-
notes the probability of survival between ages j and j + 1 for the husband and the wife 
respectively. moop are out of pocket medical expenses.  Total earnings up to the current 
period are denoted by ER while the last earnings draw at the age of retirement is eR. 
Note that these values do not change once the household is retired. 
3.2  Working Household’ s Dynamic Programming Problem 
A working household between the ages S  and R obtains income from labor earnings 
and preretirement assets.  The dynamic programming problem at age j for a working 
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household is given by
 
V (e, E−1, a, j, h) = max  nU(c/n, 1 − ω − i, h) + βΨ(h)  V (e 
' , E, a 
' ,j + 1,h 
' )dΞ(ε) 
subject to 
y = e + ra + T (e, a, j, n) 
'  oop c + a  + m = y + a − τ (e + ra) 
h 
' = F (M(m
oop),i) + (1 − δh)h + ε 
V (e, E−1, a, j, h) denotes the present discounted value of lifetime utility at age j. 
E−1  are cumulative earnings up to the current period.  The other variables are deﬁned 
above. 
4  Model Parameterization and Calibration 
In this section we specify functional forms and parameter values that we use to solve 
the model.  We start by specifying functional forms for utility and health production. 
We then set some parameter values based on information from the literature or from 
reduced form estimates from the HRS. We identify the other model parameters by ﬁtting 
the predictions of the model for the average household to data on wealth accumulation, 
medical expenses and survival probabilities.  Once we have these parameter values, we 
then solve the model household-by-household to examine predictions for every household 
in our sample. 
Preferences:  We assume households have constant relative risk-averse preferences. 
We further assume the subutility function over consumption and health has a constant 
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ρ + (1 − λ)hρ]  ρ 
U(c, h) =  . 
1 − γ 
The elasticity of substitution between the consumption-leisure composite and health is 
1/(1 − ρ).  The parameter γ is the coeﬃ cient of relative risk aversion.  Given that the 
choice of whether to invest in health and hence prolong life is endogenous, the coeﬃ cient 
of relative risk aversion γ  needs to be less than 1.  This guarantees that utility is a 
positive number.  Similar assumptions are made in the endogenous fertility literature. 
The discount factor (β) is set at 0.96, a value similar to the 0.97 value used in Hubbard, 
Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999). We also set η = 0.36 
from Cooley and Prescott (1995). 
Equivalence Scale:  This is obtained from Citro and Michael (1995) and takes the 
form 
g(A, K) = (A + 0.7K)
0.7 
where again, A indicates the number of adults and K indicate the number of children 
in the household. 
Rate of Return: We assume an annualized real rate of return (r) of 4 percent.  This 
assumption is consistent with McGrattan and Prescott (2003), who ﬁnd that the real 
rate of return for both equity and debt in the United States over the last 100 years, after 
accounting for taxes on dividends and diversiﬁcation costs, is about 4 percent.  As this 
project develops we will conduct additional sensitivity analysis on this parameter. 
Taxes: We model an exogenous, time-varying, progressive income tax that takes the 
form 
−a1 + a2)
−1/a1 ) τ(y) = a(y − (y 
where y is in thousands of dollars.  Parameters a, a1, and a2  are estimated by Gouveia 
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 and Strauss (1994, 1999) and characterize U.S. eﬀective, average household income taxes 
between 1966 and 1989. We use the 1966 parameters for years before 1966 and the 1989 
parameters for subsequent years.3 
Earnings Process:  Earnings expectations are a central inﬁ uence on life-cycle con-
sumption and health accumulation decisions, both directly and through their eﬀects on 
expected pension and social security beneﬁts. We aggregate individual earnings histories 
into household earnings histories.  The household model of log earnings (and earnings 
expectations) is 
log ej = α
i + β1AGEj + β2AGEj 
2 + uj 
uj = ρuj−1 + Cj 
where, as mentioned above, ej is the observed earnings of the household i at age j in 2004 
dollars, αi is a household speciﬁc constant, AGEj is age of the head of the household, uj 
is an AR(1) error term of the earnings equation, and Cj  is a zero-mean i.i.d., normally 
distributed error term. The estimated parameters are αi , β1, β2, ρ and σE. 
We divide households into four groups according to education and the number of 
earners in the household, resulting in four sets of household-group-speciﬁc parameters.4 
Estimates of the persistence parameters across groups range from 0.64 to 0.68. 
Transfer Programs: One purpose of this paper is to assess the importance of factors 
aﬀecting health and household wealth, including the safety net.  We model public in-
come transfer programs using the speciﬁcation in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995). 
Speciﬁcally, the transfer that a household receives while working is given by 
T = max{0,c − [e + (1 + r)a]} 
3In subsequent work we will update the parameters for tax changes since 1989. 
4The groups are (1) married, head without a college degree, one earner; (2) married, head without a 
college degree, two earners; (3) married, head with a college degree, one earner; and (4) married, head 
with a college degree, two earners. A respondent is an earner if his or her lifetime earnings are positive 
and contribute at least 20 percent of the lifetime earnings of the household. 
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 whereas the transfer that the household receives upon retiring is
 
T = max{0,c − [SS(ER) + DB(eR) + (1 + r)a]} 
This  transfer  function  guarantees  a  pre-tax  income  of  c,  which  we  set  based  on 
parameters  drawn from Moﬃ tt  (2002).  Subsistence beneﬁts for a one-parent  family 
with two children increased sharply, from $5,992 in 1968 to $9,887 in 1974 (all in 1992 
dollars).  Beneﬁts have trended down from their 1974 peak– in 1992 the consumption 
ﬁ oor was $8,159 for the one-parent, two-child family.  Following Hubbard, Skinner, and 
Zeldes,  this  formulation  implies  that  earnings,  retirement  income,  and  assets  reduce 
public beneﬁts dollar for dollar.5 
Health production: We assume that the production of health is given by F (M(moop),i) = 
χi1−χ) oop). (m
ξ , where  m  =  M(m Total medical expenditures are related to out-of-
pocket medical expenditures by a linear function that varies by insurance status.  Specif-
ically, m = ζ(moop), where ζ  is 3.66 for the uninsured, 4.94 for those with employer-
provided insurance, 3.08 for those with individual insurance, 4.74 for those with Med-
icaid, 3.32 for those with Medicare, 3.49 for those with Medicare and a supplemental 
policy, and 5.14 for those with insurance from the Veterans Administration. 
Survival Probability:  The survival function is given by the cumulative distribution 
function Ψ(h) = 1 − exp(−ψhθ). 
Health Shocks:  At each age, we assume that there are two possible values for the 
health shocks:  εh  and εl.  The ﬁrst shock εh  corresponds to being healthy and is set to 
zero. The magnitude of the health shock εl  is determined by the calibration procedure. 
The probability of the second shock is assumed to vary by age:  p60,p70,p80,p90 and p100 
refer to probabilities of ‘ bad’health shock between the ages of 0-60, 60-70, 70-80, 80-90 
and 90+ respectively. 
5In subsequent work we will extend the beneﬁt series to more recent years covered in our data. 
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 4.1  Calibration 
While many parameters are set based on estimates from the literature or by estimating 
reduced form empirical models from the HRS, additional critical parameters still need 
to be speciﬁed.  We use information on asset holdings, life tables and average medical 
expenses for the average household in the HRS to pin down these parameters.  The 
parameters we calibrate are λ, ρ, γ, ψ, θ, ξ, εl, χ, δh,p60,p70,p80,p90  and p100.  6  To calcu-
late these remaining parameters, we solve the dynamic programming problem for the 
average household - the household with average earnings over their lifetime.  We then 
use the decision rules in conjunction with observed histories of earnings to obtain model 
predictions.  Notice that while we have earnings observations on an annual basis, we 
only have medical expenses in 1998, 2000 and 2002. Hence we integrate out the lifetime 
sequence of health shocks before arriving at the model predictions for a given age.  We 
then seek to obtain the best ﬁt between model and data relative to the moments we seek 
to match. The moments we use to identify and pin down the parameters are: 
1.  Mean net worth in 1998 (age 65.3) is $346,221 
2.  Probability of dying age 54 and under: 0.62% 
3.  Probability of dying 60-64: 4.34% 
4.  Probability of dying 70-74: 9.84% 
5.  Probability of dying 75-79: 11.84% 
6.  Probability of dying 80-84: 19.35% 
6To remind readers,  these are λ (the utility weight on consumption relative to health),ρ (deter-
mines the elasticity of substitution between consumption and health),γ (the coeﬃ cient of relative risk 
aversion),ψ (the coeﬃ cient on health in the survival function),θ (the curvature of the survival func-
tion  with  respect  to  health),ξ  (the  curvature  of  the  health  production  function),εl  (the  magniture 
of the "bad" health shock),χ (the share parameter in health production between monetary and time 
inputs),δh  (the annual depreciation rate of health), and p60, p70, p80, p90  and p100  (the probabilites of 
bad health shocks occuring at diﬀerent age intervals). 
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 7.  Probability of dying 90-94: 41.73% 
8.  Probability of dying in the next 5 years for those 95 and older: 72.73% 
9.  Average total medical expenses under age 52: $16,771 
10.  Average total medical expenses for ages 53-57: $18,705 
11.  Average total medical expenses for ages 63-67: $19,852 
12.  Average total medical expenses for ages 73-77: $20,396 
13.  Average total medical expenses for ages 83-87: $22,880 
14.  Average total medical expenses for ages 93 and older: $18,742 
Essentially, this represents 14 non-linear equations in 14 unknowns. We obtained an 
exact match between the model predictions and the moments above and the resulting 
parameter values are given in the Table below. 
Parameter  λ  ρ  γ  ψ  θ  ξ  εl  χ  δh  p60  p70  p80  p90  p100 
Value  0.85  -7.2  0.86  .0011  1.84  0.77  -16.4  0.53  0.056  0.05  0.11  0.165  0.207 
A few comments are in order.  First notice that γ  is less than 1 and the resulting 
preferences are close to logarithmic.  Recall that this parameter needs to be less than 
unity  to  guarantee  that  utility  is  a strictly  positive  number.  Next,  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between consumption (more precisely, the composite of consumption and 
leisure) and health is  1 
1−ρ  = 0.12. Consumption and health are complements, as found 
by Murphy and Topel (2006) and Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2009).  The 
rate of depreciation of health is around 5.6%.  The share of goods in the production of 
health χ is 0.53, suggesting that time and goods are both important in the production 
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0.256 of health. The ‘ bad’health shock εl takes on the value -16.4, recall that the good health 
shock εh is set to 0. Finally, note that the probability of the bad health shock increases 
from around 5% for households below 60 years of age to 11% for households between 60 
and 70, to 16.5% for households between 70 and 80, to 20.7% for households between 
80 and 90 and to 25.6% to households above the age of 90. 
4.2  Model Solution 
Once we have the calibrated parameters, we solve the dynamic programming problem 
by linear interpolation on the value function.  For each household in our sample we 
compute optimal decision rules for consumption (and hence asset accumulation) and 
health investments from the oldest possible age (this is endogenous) to the beginning 
of working life (S) for any feasible realizations of the random variables:  earnings and 
health shocks. These decision rules diﬀer for each household, since each faces stochastic 
draws from diﬀerent earnings distributions (recall that is household speciﬁc). Household-
speciﬁc earnings expectations also directly inﬁ uence expectations about social security 
and pension beneﬁts. Other characteristics also diﬀer across households. Consequently, 
it is not suﬃ cient to solve the life-cycle problem for just a few household types. 
5  Results 
As emphasized in the previous discussion,  we calibrate key model parameters to the 
average  household in the data.  The ﬁrst question we address, therefore, is how the 
model matches the distribution of wealth and health spending.  We examine this issue 
by showing median values by lifetime income.  Lifetime income is deﬁned within four 
roughly  equal-sized  age  groups:  under 60,  60  to 65,  66  to 75,  and over  75.  This 
relationship is given in the table below. 
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 1998  Median Net Worth  Median Medical Expenses 
Data  Model  Data  Model 
Bottom Lifetime Income Quintile  $35,978  $22,693  $5,181  $5,684 
Second Quintile  69,534  46,680  5,794  6,783 
Middle Quintile  126,714  87,219  6,760  8,548 
Fourth Quintile  201,880  137,063  7,671  9,824 
Highest Lifetime Income Quintile  414,305  398,623  8,158  10,546 
As in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006), households are accumulating more 
wealth than the model suggests is optimal.  The median medical expenses also seem to 
match fairly closely, though the gradient of total expenditures is less steep with respect 
to lifetime income in the data than it is in the model.  The correlation of actual and 
optimal net worth is 0.74.  The correlation between actual medical expenditures and 
optimal medical expenditures in the model is 0.66.  The close correspondence between 
data and model predictions is striking, given that the model is ﬁt only to the average 
household.  We can summarize the match between model and data in the following two 
scatterplots, where we graph the ordered pair between actual and "optimal" net worth 
(from the model), and actual and optimal total medical expenditures. 
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 About 34 percent of the sample of net worth lies above the 45 degree line, indicat-
ing these households are saving less than the amount needed to equate the discounted 
marginal utility of consumption across time.  The median shortfall, conditional on un-
dersaving, is $23,543.  Our prior work described in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 
(2006) (for 1992, with only the original HRS cohort) found 16 percent of the HRS co-
hort was below their optimal target with the median shortfall being $5,600.  There are 
a number of diﬀerences between our earlier work and this paper, the three largest being 
that new cohorts have been added to the data and we are now looking at a later period; 
we have new estimates of the earning process, which show somewhat more volatility in 
earnings; and the model includes endogenous health production.  In work not shown, 
we ﬁnd the eﬀects of the ﬁrst two diﬀerences are larger than the eﬀect of the third.  But 
our earlier qualitative conclusion still holds:  Most Americans seem to be preparing well 
for ﬁnancially secure retirements.  But the degree to which this is the case is less strong 
than our earlier work suggests. 
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 The scatterplot of medical expenses and fairly high correlation between actual and 
predicted medical expenses is also encouraging to us. The central tendency of the data 
(shown in the curved cubic spline) is close to the 45-degree line. We think the model does 
a good job matching two key elements of the data —net worth and medical spending. 
5.1  Mortality 
A novel feature of our economic model is that it allows us to examine the eﬀects of policy 
changes on mortality.  But the conﬁdence readers have with our mortality results will 
depend, in part, on the ability of the model to reproduce mortality patterns in the HRS. 
To examine this, we take 10-year mortality probabilities in the HRS for two groups — 
those who are 60 years old and those who are 75 years old.  To operationalize this in 
the HRS (for the case of 60 year olds), we took everyone who entered the HRS in 1992, 
1994 or 1996 and was in the age range 58 to 62.  We then examine their mortality 
over the subsequent 10 years.  We make similar calculations for the age 75 sample. 




Survival Probabilities  Age 60  Age 75 
Data  Model  Data  Model 
Bottom Lifetime Income Quintile  0.75  0.73  0.51  0.50 
Second Quintile  0.79  0.75  0.53  0.52 
Middle Quintile  0.85  0.79  0.47  0.49 
Fourth Quintile  0.89  0.83  0.54  0.53 
Highest Lifetime Income Quintile  0.91  0.85  0.68  0.59 
The mortality calculations implied by the model require considerable calculation. 
For example,  in the ﬁrst two columns of the table we take all 60 year olds.  These 
households  face  many  diﬀerent  patterns  of  potential  health  shocks  (εl  paths).  We 
integrate out over all potential sequences between the ages 60 and 70 and calculate the 
mass of survivors.  These calculations require, of course, the optimal decision rules over 
the lifetime of households.  We make similar calculations for households age 75.  The 
survival rates implied by the model are given in the table under the column "Model." 
The model does a strikingly good job matching survival patterns in the underlying 
data, though we note that seven of the 14 moments that we use to calibrate the model 
tie down mortality probabilities by age for households with average lifetime incomes. 
This does not, however, imply that we would expect the model to reproduce survival 
patterns  for  high- or  low-lifetime  income  quintile  households.  The  most  important 
deviations between the survival data and predictions occur for households in the highest 
lifetime income quintiles.  These are likely to be the households that are most eﬃ cient 
in producing health capital. 
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 5.2  Medicare and longevity 
To illustrate the potential usefulness of our preliminary model, we do some suggestive 
calculations of the eﬀects of removing Medicare, the universal social insurance program 
that was established in 1965 to provide health insurance to the elderly.  There are 
several reasons why we focus on this policy.  First, Medicare is a massive social insurance 
program costing $325 billion in ﬁscal year 2006.  Second, end-of-life health shocks have 
been shown by several authors to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on asset accumulation.  Third, 
Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) show in the ﬁrst 10 years following the establishment 
of Medicare, there was no discernible eﬀect on mortality.  The eﬀects of policy changes 
on mortality and asset accumulation in the short- and long-run are issues the model is 
nicely designed to address. 
Suppose that Medicare were instantly eliminated and the change was not anticipated. 
All assets and health capital held by households had been accumulated under the as-
sumption that Medicare would exist. After eliminating Medicare, we can recompute the 
model and examine the eﬀects on 10-year survival probabilities. 
Age 60  Age 75 
Baseline Model  No Medicare  Baseline Model  No Medicare 
Bottom Income Quintile  0.73  0.72  0.50  0.48 
Second Lifetime Quintile  0.75  0.74  0.52  0.50 
Middle Lifetime Quintile  0.79  0.79  0.49  0.48 
Fourth Lifetime Quintile  0.83  0.83  0.53  0.53 
Highest Income Quintile  0.85  0.85  0.59  0.59 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  Table,  the  short  run  eﬀect  on  mortality  of  eliminating 
Medicare are trivially small.  This suggests the possibility that if Medicare aﬀects mor-
tality, its inﬁ uence must occur over the lifecycle.  Since most accumulation of health 
capital and wealth occurs well before retirement, health status is largely ﬁxed by age 
60-65.  Eliminating Medicare, therefore, has little eﬀect on health in the years immedi-
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 ately following its repeal. While Medicare does provide insurance against adverse health 
shocks,  our model yields results consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Finkelstein 
and McKnight:  eliminating Medicare would have a small eﬀect on 10-year survival 
probabilities immediately following repeal. 
The  long-run  eﬀect  of  Medicare  repeal  We now look at the long-run eﬀect of 
repealing Medicare, comparing model predictions for assets and survival in worlds with 
and without Medicare.  We ﬁrst look at the eﬀects of repealing Medicare on long-run 
mortality  patterns.  Perhaps  surprisingly,  in  light  of  the  previous  results,  Medicare 
repeal now has a large eﬀect on survival probabilities, particularly in the lowest lifetime 
income quintile.  In the long-run, a forward-looking household with low lifetime income 
will recognize they have no health insurance program in retirement.  They also correctly 
anticipate the lifecycle pattern of health shocks and the cumulative eﬀects of health 
depreciation, so old-age health status will be worse than health status at younger ages. 
Because health and consumption are complements, the life-cycle pattern of consumption 
mirrors the lifecycle pattern of health.  Low lifetime income households will therefore 
invest less in health, trading oﬀ a shorter expected lifespan for greater consumption in 
younger ages when the marginal utility of consumption is high relative to later in life. 
High lifetime income households can mitigate these eﬀects by self-insuring:  they engage 
in buﬀer stock saving and invest in health capital. 
Age 60  Age 75 
Baseline Model  No Medicare  Baseline Model  No Medicare 
Bottom Lifetime Income Quintile  0.73  0.66  0.50  0.44 
Second Quintile  0.75  0.72  0.52  0.46 
Middle Quintile  0.79  0.76  0.49  0.42 
Fourth Quintile  0.83  0.82  0.53  0.52 
Highest Lifetime Income Quintile  0.85  0.84  0.59  0.58 
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 The eﬀects of this experiment on wealth are shown in the table below. With Medicare 
eliminated and many elderly people paying for all medical care out of pocket,  some 
households  engage  in  additional  buﬀer  stock  saving,  self-insuring  in  the  absence  of 
Medicare (some still  have insurance provided by Medicaid,  employer-provided  plans, 
or VA-Champus).  Indeed, we see greater wealth accumulation throughout the lifetime 
income distribution.  We also see fewer medical expenditures.  The tables illustrate 
clearly a central insight into the lifecycle model with endogenous health.  Long-run 
adjustments to changes in the institutional environment will be made on two margins: 
ﬁrst, households will consume less and do more buﬀer stock saving.  Second, private 
health investment will decrease.  The result is that households will both consume less 
and die earlier in a world without Medicare.  But relative to a standard lifecycle model 
of consumption without endogenous health production, the consumption responses will 
be smaller, since a portion of the response occurs through a diminution of health capital. 
With less health capital, households correctly anticipate that they will die younger and 
hence they need to accumulate less wealth to ﬁnance consumption in retirement.  Thus, 
the model with endogenous health mitigates the eﬀects of changes in social insurance 
on consumption relative to standard lifecycle models. 
1998  Median Net Worth  Median Medical Expenses 
Lifetime Income  Model  No Medicare  Model  No Medicare 
Bottom Lifetime Income Quintile  $22,693  $49,475  $5,684  $2,891 
Second Quintile  46,680  68,392  6,783  4,373 
Middle Quintile  87,219  114,374  8,548  7,157 
Fourth Quintile  137,063  176,304  9,824  8,717 
Highest Lifetime Income Quintile  398,623  449,485  10,546  9,214 
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 6  Conclusion
 
In this paper we describe our initial eﬀorts to develop a lifecycle model with endogenous 
investment in health.  We solve the model household-by-household using data from 
the HRS.  We force the model to match moments on wealth,  mortality and medical 
expenses for the average HRS household.  It nevertheless does a nice job matching the 
distribution of wealth and survival across lifetime income quintiles.  We use the model 
to study the eﬀects of public policy on wealth accumulation and mortality.  The long-
run goal of this research project is to illuminate the tradeoﬀs households may make 
in consumption and health when confronted with exogenous shocks or policy changes. 
We ﬁnd substantial long-run tradeoﬀs between consumption and health investment in 
response to eliminating the stylized Medicare program in our model, and the responses 
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